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Abstract 
As the digital age expands and evolves, the challenge of digital governance has become 
greater. This paper explores new developments in cyber content management strategies in 
China.  
In particular, this paper highlights the rise of participatory, peer-to-peer censoring practices, 
where users are incentivised to report on each other through offering of special privileges and 
monetary rewards. This paper then goes on to examine how the People’s Daily have 
responded to the contentious events in the top 20 public opinion incidents of 2016, to 
illustrate how official media uses different types of management strategies to mediate and 
demobilise contention, on top of information containment strategies such as censorship. 
Finally, I discuss briefly the creation of a Digital United Front which seeks to incorporate 
social influencers and cyber elites into mainstream political institutions such as the CPPCC.  
Not only do these strategies further undermine the formation of a political locus opposite the 
state, they continue to subsume previously oppositional narratives into grander narratives of 
stability, rationality, and national progress. Online political participation in Chinese 
cyberspace must seek further paternalistic protection from Party authorities, often in forms of 
socio-moral grievances, in order to legitimise their contention. Although this strengthens the 
Party-state’s claim to legitimacy, ultimately this weakens the emergence of civil society in 
China as the only form of contention that can survive is those that are legitimised by the 
Party-state, and the political space oppositional to the state remain closed off.  
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Introduction 
In an increasingly digital age, scholars have been particularly focused on the emancipatory 
potential of the Internet, democratic or otherwise (Zheng 2007; 2009; Meng 2010), and its 
ability to foster a power shift in authoritarian societies such as China (Xiao 2011). In the first 
decade of the 2000s, scholars made optimistic notes on how the development of the Chinese 
Internet showed a 'deeply contentious space’ and ‘strong aspirations for a more just and 
democratic society’, venturing that cyber dissent might play a significant role in China's 
democratisation, however far down the line (Chase and Mulvenon 2002; 2009). As China 
expanded its cyber governance efforts, scholars have argued that the Chinese government 
increasingly sees the cyberspace as an outlet for ‘the voice of the public’, allowing officials 
to identify and tackle grievances before they can develop into protest and dissent (Shirk 
2011). While the Internet has diminished the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s capacity to 
set the public agenda (Esarey and Xiao 2011), digital tools have also been utilised by the 
Party to elicit, respond to and direct public opinion (MacKinnon 2011; He and Warren 2011), 
thus having a positive effect in widening political participation. This has led some to believe 
that pluralism in the form of online deliberations might be considered a ‘foundational 
condition for a more interactive and liberalised political order rooted in greater public 
deliberation and societal feedback’(Lewis 2013). 
In the last decade, digital and technological tools has been rapidly deployed in increasingly 
wider aspects of socioeconomic life worldwide(Schlæger 2013), and China is no exception. 
However, while the role of technology has been lauded in social movements such as the Arab 
Spring, researchers argue that for China, the CCP has already mastered the technology to the 
extent that the technology serves as an authoritarian consolidation tool, in that China has 
already become a ‘networked authoritarian regime’ (MacKinnon 2011; Tsai 2016). Indeed, 
the Internet has become particularly relevant to discussions on how the CCP might seek to 
renew its efforts on propaganda, public opinion management and social management (Brady 
2009; Pieke 2012; Shambaugh 2007). 
In recent years, Internet usage in China has continued to grow rapidly and the number of 
netizens have nearly tripled from 253 million in 2008 to 772 million in 2017, with an Internet 
coverage of 55.8%. Much has happened during this time. Google left China in 2010, then 
slowly foreign social media platforms and sources of information began to disappear in 
Chinese cyberspace one by one: Twitter, Tumblr, Instagram, New York Times, Wall Street 
Journal, Reddit, just to name a few. The Chinese state deployed proactive and varied 
strategies for Internet governance: dedicated offices and tactical teams were established, 
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censorship tightened, and the technological barrier for circumventing censorship through 
methods such as Virtual Private Networks (VPN) were raised higher and higher. In the last 
few years in particular, with Xi Jinping’s rise to power, venting space for dissenting opinion 
in Chinese cyberspace has become increasingly narrow.  
While censorship and the stifling of information plays a significant part in China’s cyber 
management strategy, there is increasing awareness that the sociopolitical interaction and 
development in Chinese cyberspace cannot be understood through censorship, or the either/or 
dichotomy (such as authoritarianism vs democracy, state vs netizens) alone (G. Yang 2014). 
The proactive strategies taken by the CCP in trying to control and manage online narratives 
and public discourse means that the cyberspace also serves as a ‘repertoire of contention’, 
which, as Tilly defines it, is ‘a limited set of routines that are learned, shared, and acted out 
through a relatively deliberate process of choice’ (Tilly 2015). This not only directly affect 
netizens’ behaviour, but also affect their knowledge of how to behave in contentious space, 
and affect how others, authorities and peers alike, expect them to behave in contentious times 
(Tarrow 2011). Thus, contesting narratives in the cyberspace is a continuous process of 
interaction, negotiation and mediation, with both sides shaping the behaviour and 
management strategies of the other.  
The paper focuses specifically on the nuances of new developments in the three major 
proactive approaches of online content management that has evolved recently. In particular, 
this paper highlights the rise of participatory, peer-to-peer censoring practices, where users 
are incentivised to report on each other through offering of special privileges and monetary 
rewards. This paper then goes on to examine how the People’s Daily have responded to the 
contentious events in the top 20 public opinion incidents of 2016, to illustrate how official 
media uses different types of management strategies to mediate and demobilise contention, 
on top of information containment strategies such as censorship. Finally, this paper discusses 
briefly the recent creation of a Digital United Front, which seeks to incorporate social 
influencers and cyber elites into mainstream political institutions such as the Chinese People's 
Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), and tasking them as ideological and moral 
watchdogs in the cyberspace. Not only does these strategies further undermines the formation 
of a political locus opposite the state, they have also led to the subsumption of previously 
oppositional narratives into grander narratives of stability, rationality, and national progress. 
Despite Xi’s assurances in his Party speeches, the space for consultative or deliberative 
political participation online continues to narrow. 
4 
Methods 
This paper explores two emerging trends in online content management in China: the growth 
and normalisation of peer-to-peer censorship, and the specific management strategies of 
official arbitration of online contention. For the first section, I look at the publicly released 
data by the China Internet Illegal Reporting Centre, available at 12377.com. The second 
section uses data from the People’s Daily web archives and the People’s Daily Public 
Opinion Monitoring Office, available at people.com.cn.  
Online Content Control in China: An Overview  
Censorship, as a fundamental part of how the CCP manages information flow in an 
increasingly digitised age, has been an integral part of Internet research on China. With four 
elements that can shape behaviour in cyberspace — the architecture of the Internet itself, 
regulations, social norms, and the market (Lessig 2009) — China has largely monitored the 
Internet by focusing on the first two factors in the past, using a mixture of low-tech and high-
tech methods (Chase and Mulvenon 2002). The backbone network that the Chinese Internet 
runs on (the Internet Interconnecting Network) can only be established by government-
approved agencies and businesses, and they in turn license Internet Service Providers (ISPs). 
All networks are filtered through international gateways located in Beijing, Shanghai, and 
Guangzhou (B. Liang and Lu 2010). Network filtering (severing the network when the Great 
Firewall detects an attempted access to censored websites) are thus the most common 
technological forms of censorship alongside with search engine filtering, keyword filtering 
(that prevents posts containing sensitive keywords from being posted) and deletion after post 
(Bamman and O'Connor 2012).  
Information that is prohibited in the Chinese cyberspace falls under nine broad categories, 
including content that: 
(1) is contrary to the basic principles that are laid down in the Constitution, laws, 
or administration regulations; (2) is seditious to the ruling regime of the state or 
the system of socialism; (3) subverts state power or sabotages the unity of the 
state; (4) incites ethnic hostility or racial discrimination, or disrupts racial unity; 
(5) spreads rumours or disrupts social order; (6) propagates feudal superstitions; 
disseminates obscenity, pornography, or gambling; incites violence, murder, or 
terror; instigates others to commit offences; (7) publicly insults or defames others; 
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(8) harms the reputation or interests of the state; or (9) has content prohibited by 
laws or administrative regulations (Chase and Mulvenon 2002) 
Despite the numerous regulations and policies in place, one common finding is that the 
enforcement of China’s Internet filtering is inconsistent. Studies show that Internet blocks 
have come and gone, and the content of blocks also varies from time to time, most likely 
because of the fact that there is no coherent and consistent decision-making process (Hartford 
2000; Sohmen 2001). The responsibility of propaganda and censorship is divided across 
different ministries, thus the process of censorship is a complex and intricate one (Yu 2009; 
Brady 2012). Regional variations in censorship has also been shown, with far West and North 
regions such as Tibet and Xinjiang experiencing much higher percentage of post deletions 
compared to the Eastern seaboard region (Wright 2014; Bamman and O'Connor 2012). 
Nevertheless, through access blockage for foreign websites and content filtering of domestic 
websites, the Chinese Party-state has a firm grip on managing the Internet through its 
architecture and regulations. What is relatively less considered is how the Party-state have 
been increasingly focusing on managing the Internet though influencing social norms and 
market behaviours, which became increasingly prominent since Xi came to power in 2013.  
While the CCP has always attempted to control political content and narratives on the 
internet, in recent years, the Xi administration has expanded such control to previously 
relatively-free areas such as the entertainment sector, citing purification of moral values as its 
key legitimating reasons. From 2013 onwards, we have seen the re-introduction of ‘campaign 
style’, mobilising governance strategies in Internet content management, especially in the 
treatment of Key Opinion Leaders (the ‘Big Vs’ on Weibo) who have stepped out of the line 
(G. Yang 2017). The downfall of key online opinion leaders have paved way for the rise of 
‘we-media’, a new term coined to describe bloggers and microbloggers that self-generate and 
disseminate content online. In 2017, these were met with similar fates as the Big Vs before 
them. Paparazzi-style Weibo accounts that generated celebrity gossip were rapidly shut down 
with the state justifying its actions as ‘clearing the cyberspace of inappropriate values’. 
Bilibili and Acfun, both video streaming websites that serves as cyber hotspots for 
youngsters, had large sections of content shut down due to both inappropriate content and 
copyright concerns. Homosexual content on forums began to be targeted from October 2017, 
and gay forum boards began shutting down especially on major forums with high traffic such 
as Tianya. Major social media outlets such as Tencent Wechat, Sina Weibo and Baidu 
Forums were each given repeated warnings about their laxness in managing ‘illegal and 
inappropriate user-generated content’. In April 2018, four news apps (Today Headlines, 
Phoenix News, Netease News and Tencent Kuaibao) were suspended from App Store 
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downloads for similar poor content management reasons, the length of the ban ranging from 
3 days to 3 weeks. Kuaishou, a Vine-like short vlogger site was publicly criticised by China 
Central Television (CCTV) on air for its ‘low cultural value’, after which the app changed its 
front page to showcase political ‘main melody’ propaganda videos including videos heralding 
the success of the CCP. Even the People’s Daily Public Opinion Monitoring Office noted that 
‘there is now a visible hand over the online entertainment sector, which used to be free.’ 
(Hua, Canliang, and Pan 2018)  
More stringent censorship with temporal sensitivities has also been observed in the last few 
years. On 25th February 2018, Xi Jinping announced he is going to abolish term limits to the 
Chinese presidency. The news was received explosively in Chinese cyberspace and in the 
following days social media users experienced a kind of zero-tolerance censorship usually 
reserved for known political dissenters: on Weibo, users who spoke out against the decision 
or reblogged any related content were banned from accessing their account, and the most 
fervent disagreers had their accounts completely removed. The keyword “gaixian” or 
‘changing the constitution’ rendered no results in any of the social media search engines. 
Both and Weibo and Douban (a site that hosts discussion groups) removed the ability to track 
trending topics in order to avoid political complications during the National Congress that 
took place that week. The more content heavy Zhihu, a quora-esque Q&A website, had its 
app removed from the app stores across all platforms for 7 days during this period, due to “its 
ineffectual management, and dissemination of illegal information”. While its website 
remained accessible, it was heavily censored and according to Zhihu’s own report, in the 
week between 22nd February and 28 February, 37,770 posts were removed due to being 
politically sensitive, 37.68% increase from the week before (Zhihu 2018).  
Despite more stringent controls, the continuing spread of the Internet means top-down 
content monitoring and deletion will become increasingly inefficient. As a result, in the last 
few years there has been a proliferation of crowdsourced monitoring and reporting 
approaches that has had a significant impact on how netizens negotiate and respond to 
contention online.  
Peer-to-Peer Censorship: Growth and Normalisation  
In order to maintain the equilibrium between expansion of the Internet and monitor and 
control the anarchistic information overflow it inevitably brings, the party-state both 
mobilises its own resources and co-opts the support of voluntary or involuntary collaborators 
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(Wacker 2003). Since the 2000s, the Party-state have made self-regulation a priority for 
online content control, and exerted pressure on nonstate sectors to increase policing power on 
their behalf(Cheung 2005). A domestic self-discipline mechanism was established in 2002 
through the issuing of a “Public Pledge on Self-Discipline for the China Internet Industry”, 
which resulted in more sweeping censor mechanisms as many Internet platforms and 
businesses decided to play safe when faced with broad and vague regulations (Endeshaw 
2004; Sohmen 2001). 
In addition, China Internet Illegal Reporting Centre (12377) was launched in 2005 and put 
under the direct supervision of The Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission. To incentivise 
users to report ‘illegal and harmful content’ online, discretionary cash rewards were offered 
from 2014 onwards (Graph 1). As a result, the use of grassroot reporting of illegal activities 
has particularly gained prominence in the last few years, with 5.7 million illegal posts 
reported in February 2018, 88.6% of which coming from major websites such as Sohu, 
Baidu, and Sina. Out of these, Sina received most number of reported cases: upwards of 1.8 
million (China Internet Illegal Reporting Centre 2018). Despite the reward programme being 
halted in 2018, the number of posts reported each month has only suffered a momentary 
decline, and indeed resumed a fast pace of growth in recent months. The numbers suggest 
that a reporting culture can be said to have been established online.  
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Figure 1 Increase in number of posts reported by netizens (2012-2018) 
On 27th September 2017, Weibo announced that they, under the directive of the Beijing 
Cyber Administration Office, are recruiting 1,000 ‘Weibo community supervisors’, who 
would report “illegal, pornographic and harmful” information on Weibo to the platform 
administrators. Successful applicants would receive perks such as 200 yuan per month to 
subsidise their broadband fees, free access to premium Weibo features, and a special orange 
coloured VIP status symbol next to their username. Each Weibo supervisor is required to 
report at least 200 illegal posts a month, and those who report the most number of illegal 
posts could win a range of prizes including iPhones, Apple products and laptops (Sina Weibo 
2017). According to Sina’s statistics, 1.56 million illegal (pornographic) posts were reported 
by 810 active Weibo supervisors in the month of February in 2018, where the top 20 
‘performers’ reported an average of 67,000 posts per person in that month (Sina Weibo 
2018). To put it in perspective, assuming the supervisors worked 8 hour days with no breaks, 
one post was reported every twenty seconds. 
Weibo is not alone in the recruitment of human censors. The Cyber Administration 
Commission published the Management Rules of Internet Group Services in October 2017, 
which set out the responsibility of group creators and owners on Wechat and QQ. There are 
also attempts to control and monitor Internet group activities locally: any resident of Xi’an 
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with more than 30,000 Weibo or Wechat followers, for example, must register with the local 
authorities (Hua, Canliang, and Pan 2018). These moves are a part of a wider campaign of 
‘Self-Discipline Officers’ launched by the Beijing Internet Association (BIA), which is under 
the direct supervision of the Ministry of Propaganda. In year of 2014, BIA recorded that 652 
Self-Discipline Officers operated in 21 web domains, reporting half a million illegal posts, 
including 70,085 ‘politically harmful’ posts, amounting to 12.85% of total deletions (Beijing 
Internet Association 2015).  
Crowd-sourced monitoring and reporting also played a big part in Xi’s anti-corruption drive: 
cadres who spend lavishly and abuse their power risk being exposed on social media and 
trigger an investigation by the the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI). 
This ‘mass supervision’ tactic recalls the mass-line mobilisation strategies employed in the 
Mao era, which promoted direct interaction between the state and society (Tang 2016; 
Andreas and Dong 2017). In April 2018, for example, a leaked Wechat screenshot was made 
viral on Weibo, recording a conversation between the wife of Guang’an’s Deputy Party 
Secretary Yan Chunfeng and her child’s nursery teacher. The teacher accidentally posted a 
complaint of her child’s inappropriate behaviour in a shared Wechat group containing the 
mother, and the mother retaliated by demanding “apologise now or I will tell your nursery’s 
CEO to come to me and explain the way you treat Party Secretary Yan’s kid!” Later in the 
conversation, she boasted about her ability to immediately remove the teacher from the 
nursery employment roster. In a separate screenshot, she also admitted her child have 
received special treatment in being enrolled in a highly sought after school ahead of its 
official recruiting schedule, again due to the father’s political position. The post gained a 
wide following on Weibo and a few weeks later, an official announcement was made that 
CCDI was launching an investigation into Yan Chunfeng, to much celebratory response. 
Whether this is an orchestrated political manoeuvre by Yan’s political foes or a genuine post 
made by a concerned citizen is unclear: what is evident is that such incidents actually boosts 
Xi’s administration’s image when popular demands seems to have been met. The speed and 
decisiveness with which the Party Central have responded to this incident has further 
legitimised crowd-sourced monitoring and reporting as an acceptable form of contention, one 
where grassroot grievances could be aired and responded to. This form of contention, 
however, risks a populist rupture (Mudde 2017; Espejo 2017; Abts and van Kessel 2015), as 
the Party Central is seen as the ultimate source of justice who must directly respond to 
demands from the populace, which weakens popular trust in intermediary institutions such as 
the media and other governmental and legal institutions.  
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Official Arbitration of Online Contention in the Social Media Age 
The CCP has realised the need to have an official online presence early in the expansion of 
the Internet in China. Projects such as ‘Government Online’ were initiated as early as 1999 to 
‘enhance the presence of ministries, administrative units and local government in cyberspace, 
furthering transparency and accountability by making more information accessible to 
citizens, and fighting corruption and fraud’(D. L. Yang 2001). As social media began to 
amass popularity, they became ideological and political battlegrounds. The Party has cracked 
down on social media opinion leaders, while local government accounts have proliferated as 
beta-institutions to deal with netizen’s grievances (Svensson 2014; Schlæger and Jiang 2014). 
Researchers have identified a multitude of ways that the Party-state have been trying to meet 
the challenges of governing through the Internet: Esarey sees the installation of government 
accounts on social media as a form of responsive and interactive online governance (Esarey 
2015), Han focused on the state-sponsored commentators known as ‘fifty-cent armies’ (Han 
2015), while Repnikova and Fang argued that netizens are now included as thought 
collaborators in a authoritarian participatory persuasion regime (Repnikova and Fang 2018). 
Furthermore, while previous research suggested that the state had a passive role in the 
emerging microblogsphere, that it might be able to exercise censorship, but has ‘lost 
ideational leadership’ (Tong and Lei 2013); this has also changed in the past few years. There 
are now 175,000 official government affairs Weibo accounts, 136,000 of which are official 
institutional accounts, and 39,000 are accounts owned by government officials (S. Wang 
2017). Indeed, increasingly the main propaganda apparatuses of the Party-state has 
emphasised the need to update their thought work techniques, as this People’s Daily Editorial 
suggests: 
“In a country with 700 million netizens, the regulators of the Internet will be 
mocked if their thoughts cannot keep up with the masses, they will be frustrated if 
they don’t have a couple of tricks up their sleeves, they will be constantly worried 
if they don’t have more than one way of dealing with problems, and if they don’t 
achieve good regulatory results they will be constantly criticised by everyone.” 
(People's Daily Editorial 2018) 
The Editorial went on to suggest that those doing propaganda work must update their 
repertoire with the demands of the digital age and avoid approaching the masses with the 
‘same old tone’. Ironically, this article is written in the exact outdated tone and format that it 
is trying to discourage. Furthermore, the editorial piece still subjects cyber-plurality to black-
and-white political labelling:  
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We need to be able to differentiate the plethora of opinions on the Internet… 
Those issues are that academic, we can allow them to flourish, while positively 
guiding them. Those who are ideologically misguided, we need to be tolerant and 
seek to conform them. The politically sabotaging issues however, we will have to 
fight and struggle against with all that we have. 
Although a heavy emphasis is placed on self-censorship, the regulations and extent to which 
content should be censored is often vague as above. This power of uncertainty and 
monopolising the power of interpretation in the hands of the authority has been demonstrated 
to be a very effective control strategy (Hassid 2008). This is because the punishment for 
failing to censor appropriately can be severe: as such, often institutions and websites over-
censor themselves, leading to strict crackdowns and swift deletions. When the tension builds 
between Internet platform censors and its users over issues that do not threaten the Party-
state’s capacity to rule, however, the presence of official accounts on social media allows 
Party mouthpieces such as the People’s Daily to step in and act as the mediator, thus 
establishing itself as the voice of reason and guiding authority.  
The Party-state’s attempt at expanding propaganda work in the cyberspace ‘using the 
language of the netizens’ is, therefore, an active attempt to control and transform and 
subjugate online civic discourse into its official narrative. As a part of the more orderly and 
subtle public opinion and information management technique, official outlets of information 
are digitally revamped, government social media accounts are expanded, netizens are invited 
to join the ‘family unit’ of their leader and consume practical services exclusive to official 
channels (Repnikova and Fang 2018). Increasingly, the Party-state also does this by acting as 
the ultimate authority in mediating online contention, stepping in to conciliate contentious 
topics appearing on the Chinese Internet.  
For this section, I looked at the top twenty public opinion incidents identified by the People’s 
Daily Public Opinion Monitoring Office in 2016, and identified whether they were of a 
contentious nature. A public opinion incident could be very popular but not contentious, such 
as China winning the Olympics. An incident was only categorised as contentious if it 
generated significant amount of controversy and online debate, and, crucially, if it contained 
contentious elements that positioned netizens in conflict with the authorities. Although data 
was available for 2017 and 2018, there were not enough samples of contentious events in the 
following two years. Official media responses related to each event such as People’s Daily 
Editorials were collected and subsequently coded using NVIVO 12, with secondary level 
coding organising data into themes.  
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Table 1 shows an example of how the seven most contentious topics in the top 20 public 
opinion incidents in 2016 were managed by People’s Daily official outlets. 
[TABLE 1 HERE]
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 DE-ESCALATION  DELEGATION  DEPOLITICISATION CENSORSHIP 
 Challenge Rumours 
Emphasis On Govt 











Lei Yang (Alleged 
Police Brutality) 
"We need patience to 
find the truth… I 
believe… the police 
will not dare to cover 
up brutality nor do 
they have a reason to 
do so" 10 May 
"Beijing People's 
Procuratorate 
accepted the case in a 
timely fashion and 
everyone involved felt 
how fair and just the 
law is" 1 June 






"The state is now 
investigating Baidu… 
such rapid responses 
show how responsive 
the government is to 
the people's need and 
their sense of 
responsibility" 3 May 
"It is not enough for 
corporations not to 
do evil but they must 
bear responsibility for 
their actions" 1 May 
— 
"People will fall for 
medical fraud when 
they are clutching at 
straws… they need to 
give up unrealistic 
hopes when faced 





about fake vaccines 
leads to arrests of a 
35-year-old mother" 
26 March 
"Premier Li Kekang 
made important 
instructions… 357 
people have been 
held accountable 
which lets the people 
feel how determined 
the Party and the 
state is in solving this 
case" 23 March 
"Marketisation means 
it's difficult to control 
the vaccines sources 
and logistics… some 
institutions and 
individuals would 
partake in illegal 
activities for personal 
profit" 25 March 
"Local government 
cadres must be held 
accountable and 
should resign" 28 
April 
"It's understandable 
that the people would 
panic after a vaccine 
scandal, as they have 
no way to tell of 
vaccines are real or 






"In events that needs 
expert knowledge, 
scientists… should 
help stabilise public 
emotions" 24 June 
"The Education 
department has a 
clear zero-tolerance 
attitude to these 
problems which 
makes us see hope" 
27 June 
"When schools don't 
have enough funds to 
satisfy the equipment 
needs for government 
checks, they opt for 
the quick and low 
quality option" 27 
June 
"Beijing has set a 
good example of 
positively dealing with 
these problems… how 







"After the crime was 
discovered the county 
government instituted 
emergency 
procedures, to help 
those involved and to 
solve the case" 16 Sep 
— 
"We have held the 
cadres at the county, 
township and village 
levels accountable" 16 
Sep 
"One of the main 
reasons accounting 
for the tragedy is that 
the cadres failed to 
actively diffuse 
conflicts among the 
community… the 
family had very little 
interactions with the 
villagers and had poor 
relationships with 




decisions needs to be 
laid out carefully 
otherwise they will be 
misinterpreted by the 
public" 14 May 
"Hubei & Jiangsu 
educational 
departments have 
issued statements to 
say there is no 
reducing intake 
numbers" 14 May 
— — — Protest Censored 
Anti-Nuclear 
Protest 
— — — — — 
Protest censored, no 
direct response - govt 
ultimately backed 
down 
Table 1. Content management strategies in contentious topics in top 20 public opinion incidents, 2016.  
Source: People’s Daily Online (http://www.people.com.cn/) 
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In dealing with public opinion incidents, two main types of strategies can be identified: 
information management, and information containment. The main containment strategy is 
censorship. Blanket censorship however, only occurs when contention threatens to lead to 
mass mobilisation (King, Pan, and Roberts 2013), while the baseline level of censorship 
applies in most other cases. We can see that in the seven incidents identified, only three 
incidents prompted blanket bans of mentions of mobilisation attempts (petitions and offline 
protests). The management strategies, however, are more varied, and can be broadly 
classified into three further categories: de-escalation, delegation, and depoliticisation. These 
strategies are examined in more detail below. 
Deescalation 
It has been suggested that two types of discourses exist in Chinese society: the top-down 
official discourse, dominated by traditional media, and the bottom-up civic discourse, 
existing mostly in the online sphere (Y. Zhao 2008; Ellis, Kent, and Xu 2017). Dominant 
discourses in mass media ‘assumes crucial significance in defining and interpreting certain 
events use to its advantaged social position and historical social influence’ (Stockmann 
2013). Meanwhile, rising civic discourses in social media ‘empowers marginalised general 
public to reflect on, resist and deconstruct the top-down dominant frameworks’ (Ellis, Kent, 
and Xu 2017). Although the two discourses can collaborate and balance each other, when in 
contentious events, the two discourses are often engaged in conflict and fighting for 
dominance over each other. Grassroot counter-narratives would emerge during contentious 
events drawing upon everyday experiences and moral judgements to argue ‘risk out of 
control’, while official narratives would seek de-escalation of contention by emphasising 
stability and ‘risk under control’ (Y. Wang 2017). A good example of this is the Lei Yang 
case, where suspected police brutality led to the death of an environmentalist in Beijing. The 
grassroot narratives centred around how the protagonist (Lei Yang) was an ‘unlikely victim’, 
due to the fact that he was well-educated, middle class, and had no prior criminal history or 
altercation with the police. The anxiety of being subject to random acts of police brutality 
was acknowledged by the People’s Daily, and addressed accordingly:  
“People also ask: if we are not like Lei Yang who graduated from a top university 
in Beijing, if something like this happens to us, will we just disappear into 
obscurity? … Citizens should not die a wrongful death and the police should not 
be accused wrongly either. We need patience… I choose to believe with good 
intentions that after years of experience, the police will not dare to cover up 
brutality nor do they have a reason to do so.” (People’s Daily, 10 May 2016) 
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Risk-under-control, de-escalation narratives fall into two further types of accounts: 
challenging rumours, and emphasising rapid response and action taken by the government. 
The former account frame the public and netizens as emotional, misled citizens with limited 
access to reliable information. By contrast, the government, regulatory bodies and experts are 
framed as the only authoritative and trustworthy sources of information, and are called upon 
to dispel rumours and myths perpetuated by the unwitting public. For instance, when the 
public grew concerned over the use of recycled tyres in the making of sports equipment in 
schools, the People’s Daily called for vigilance against ‘unscientific rumours’: 
In events that needs expert knowledge, scientists need to step up and help 
stabilise public emotions, let the scientific fact dominate the discussion. (Ya 
2016) 
The official narratives offer emotional sympathy rather than directly engaging with public 
questions of government accountability and transparency, thus delegitimising any counter-
narratives in the process. In extreme cases, those who are found to be spreading rumours can 
be arrested (Z. Wang 2016a). 
Parallel to challenging rumours is the emphasis on government rapid response. We can see 
from Table 1 that emphasis of rapid government action is a standard and consistent 
management strategy in almost all contentious events, where as other strategies are employed 
more ad-hoc. Indeed, according to People’s Daily statistics for 2017, the response rate for 
reblogged public opinion incidents from official accounts is 90%, with 42% rapid response 
rate (within 24 hours) and 65% response rate within 72 hours. Different levels of response are 
reserved for incidents of different severity: local events are usually responded to on a 
municipal level, while cross-city, provincial level events would also attract attention from the 
highest institutional ranks. For instance, the Chengdu meteorological office, environmental 
agency and public health watchdog all responded to the 2017 Chengdu smog at a local level, 
while the National Health and Family Planning Commission stepped in to deal with a HIV 
tainted blood scandal at a Zhejiang hospital at a national level (Zhang, Sun, and Liang 2017). 
For large scale public health events such as the fake vaccine scandal, directives from the 
highest leadership such as Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang is often quoted (Editorial 2016). In all 
the cases, narrative emphasis is made on how the government is actively informing, 
communicating and thus engaging with the public, which is a common political strategy for 
increasing public political trust (Catterberg and Moreno 2006). Public concern is assuaged by 
reminding netizens that governments and high ranking officials have been notified of the 
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contentious event, thus further de-legitimising any means of action instigated by non-
established political actors.  
Delegation 
If we follow McAdam et al’s definition of contentious politics, then the types of contention 
seen in the Chinese Internet can be seen as transgressive contentions rather than contained 
contentions (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2003), whereby the netizens as claimants are non-
established political actors often employing innovative or forbidden means of action. Online 
contention in the Chinese cyberspace however, does not only arise from struggles between 
the authorities and the public (such as the Lei Yang case), but also from discontent over the 
belief that the authorities have failed to protect the public from other malevolent actors, such 
as abusive local officials and unethical large corporations. Central government as embodied 
by the CCP leadership are seen to have a paternalistic duty from protecting its citizens from 
local and corporate abuse (Miao 2016b), and when an event highlights how the paternalistic 
protection have failed, attention is shifted to the shortcomings of the current political regime, 
and contention occurs. In order to de-escalate these types of contention, official narratives 
often delegate responsibility to corporations and local governments. For instance, when some 
running tracks in schools were discovered to be made from poisonous material, official 
narratives were quick to delegate responsibility to both the corporations and schools, blaming 
the poor profit-seeking moral judgement on both sides. At the same time, emphasis is made 
on how fast the local government have acted to punish the offenders, while calling for other 
local governments to follow. Attention is diverted away from counter-narratives that 
questioned the legal framework for quality control, and government accountability in general, 
in order to frame the story as ‘risk already controlled’. In the case of Yang Gailan, a poor 
rural woman who committed murder-suicide of her whole family after being denied poverty 
relief from the local government, the official editorial emphasised the shortcomings of the 
local cadres, and subverted the counter-narratives that questioned rural-urban inequality, 
poverty reduction strategies, and the opaqueness of how poverty relief is implemented at the 
local level.  
Part of the delegation strategy reflects the centre-local relationship and political trust in 
Chinese society. Recent studies have found that many in China continue to hold hierarchical 
trust towards the government, and although trust in central government is not as high as 
researchers have previously argued, it is nevertheless higher than local government trust (Li 
2016; D. Zhao and Hu 2017). There is evidence that residents use the central government as a 
shield to fight against power abuse by local government officials, especially in rural areas 
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(O’brien and Li 2005). The CCP certainly seeks to capitalise on the public’s relatively higher 
diffuse trust in the central government as it exercises strict control over the media and 
education system in China (Kennedy 2009). In state-controlled traditional media such as 
newspapers and televisions, issue-specific criticism against local governments are allowed, 
and denunciation of local officials in central-led campaigns are common (Chan 2002; Li 
2013; Steinhardt 2017). Official narrative of anti-corruption campaigns, for example, are 
framed around the struggle and determination of the central government battling against local 
offenders (Shi 2008). Effusive political control, including daily immersion in state-led 
narratives, in turn encourages the development of hierarchical trust patterns among the 
Chinese public (Wu and Wilkes 2018). Therefore, it is perhaps unsurprising to see that in 
many of the risk-under-control narratives, the state emphasises on remedying local 
government oversights, punishing local culprits, and highlight the swiftness of central 
government response.  
Another part of the delegation strategy shifts the focus of sociopolitical contention to 
corporate accountability and social responsibility. Similar to the the hierarchal central-local 
trust, the Chinese public exhibit a much lower trust towards major corporations and 
companies compared to the central government (42.5% vs 95.3% in 2001 according to the 
World Value Survey) (Ramasamy and Yeung 2009). The private sector at large are seen as 
amoral and profit-driven (Miao 2016a), whereas the government are expected to be 
benevolent and give moral consideration to policy decisions (Tong 2011). Official 
government responses to contentious issues involving large corporations often acknowledge 
the fact that the public have called for government action, thus fulfilling the role of the 
ultimate arbiter in contentious situations:  
When the [institution implicated] have not yet spoken, when the public are 
simmering in rage, the truth can only emerge if regulatory bodies [监管部门] 
respond swiftly and investigate thoroughly (S. Wang 2016a). 
In these communications, ‘regulatory bodies’, or ‘relevant departments’ [相关部门/有关部
门] are used to denote some form of macro-control that comes from the above, without being 
specific to the nature or the function of the department entailed. Ultimately the purpose of 
these communications is to reassure and strengthen the ‘risk-under-control’ narratives in 
order to demobilise contention. 
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Depoliticisation 
In recent years, the Party-state have increasingly focused their efforts in promoting certain 
types of acceptable debates online, namely moral and value debates, while discouraging 
debates on political issues and reframing issues of sociopolitical natures into moral 
controversies. According to the 2017 Public Opinion Monitoring Report, public opinion 
incidents that are of a social and moral nature should be welcomed, as they tend to distract 
public attention away from more sensitive topics such as economic, military and political 
issues (Hua, Canliang, and Pan 2018). Indeed, it has been noted that the state has allowed 
protests in certain circumstances when they provide useful information to the state about 
citizen grievances, and when the participants are willing to pursue weaker, non destabilising 
strategies (Lorentzen 2017). In the past few years there has been a noticeable shift in public 
opinion incidents that centre around moral controversies, protection of disadvantaged groups, 
scams, and ideological conflicts. Labour conflicts and class actions that have the potential to 
generate collective action have been in decline. As public attention on social issues are likely 
to wax and wane as time progresses, they are not seen as particularly threatening by the state. 
The report is also confident in the response rate and efficiency of official government 
accounts in dissipating any tension surrounding social incidents (Hua, Canliang, and Pan 
2018). As a part of the deescalating and managing of online contention, therefore, it is 
necessary to reframe and redefine online conflicts into moral issues, rather than political 
issues. In doing so, again the focus of the contention is shifted from structural causes to 
individual causes, which precludes any criticisms against the regime and prevents any 
potential mobilisations. For instance, in the Yang Gailan case, the narrative focused on the 
poor family’s social exclusion from the village and assigned superficial blame on local cadres 
who did not realise such exclusion would lead to tragedy: 
We learned that the Yang family had a fraught relationship among themselves 
with many conflicts. They did not get along with their neighbours and did not 
involve themselves in the village. Although the local cadres were aware of this, 
they did not pay sufficient attention to the matter, and did not help to resolve the 
conflict. (Z. Wang 2016b) 
Out of the four ‘lessons’ identified in the murder-suicide case, three were focused on the 
‘special circumstances’ of the Yang family, i.e., that it was not a harmonious family and had 
strained neighbourhood relationships. Only a cursory mention is made of how poor relief is 
administered at the ground level and again the emphasis was made on how the local cadre 
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‘overlooked’ the special circumstances of the Yang family and was not able to help them, 
rather than on discussions of more deep-seated structural issues.  
Similarly in the Wei Zexi case, where a college student died after receiving questionable and 
unsuccessful treatment for sarcoma from a hospital he had found promoted on the search 
engine Baidu, the People’s Daily published an article where the focal point of discussion was 
whether people should ‘grasp at straws’ when faced with a terminal diagnosis, and whether it 
was wise to have ‘unrealistic hopes’ (Bai 2016). This moralising narrative, which essentially 
blamed victims of medical fraud for their own fates, was met with widespread backlash. In 
the social media discussion that ensued, netizens pointed out that the contentious issue with 
Wei Zexi lies not in his decision to pursue questionable treatment, but the fact that he chose 
the treatment after careful research, but the information presented to him by domestic search 
engine Baidu was biased and unreliable. One netizen wrote: 
The hospital ranked first on Baidu, it was listed as a First Tier hospital, the 
treatment was advertised by China Central Television, and the doctor had 
numerous awards… If the hospital was as described and still his treatment was 
unsuccessful, then we can’t blame anyone. But everything was a lie. The ranking 
on Baidu was paid for, the hospital department was outsourced [to private 
contractors], the treatment was obsolete, and many of the doctor’s awards and 
titles are fake. And then you tell us we have to be calm when faced with life and 
death? That’s fucking stupid. (Zhihu 2016) 
Although some also voiced concerns over how private healthcare providers are regulated, the 
main thrust of the grievance were aimed at Baidu’s immoral profit-seeking behaviour. Soon 
after, the People’s Daily published another editorial that emphasised the need for better 
corporate social responsibility, and announced that more stringent regulations on information 
provision are now in place (S. Wang 2016b). Again, the official narrative appear sympathetic 
towards the public grievances and stress that the risks are now under control through prompt 
response from the higher authorities, thus precluding any further contention or mobilisation.  
Digital United Front 
Another important mechanism in the guidance of public opinion is the United Front 
department, which was revived in the late 1970s in response to the challenges arising from 
China’s transition to market economy and a more pluralistic society. This is particularly 
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important in ensuring hegemony, which, according to Gramsci, is achieved when a state does 
not rely on coercion because it is also supported by civil society’s consent and its subjects 
accept their domination as legitimate. This legitimacy is then known as “common sense” 
(Simon 2015). Leadership of the governing body must be reflected in national popular 
appeals that can subsume narrow economic or social interests, and united front work is the 
critical tool to achieve this (Groot 2004). The United Front Work Department (UFWD), 
whose main role is to manage and ensure a supportive relationship between extra-Party elites 
such as academics, social and commercial elites, is now a key player in sustaining CCP’s 
claim to a consultative democracy.  
This department has been given renewed priority and focus under Xi Jinping (R. Wang and 
Groot 2018).In 2015 the CCP issued The Proposed Regulations of the United Front Work of 
the Chinese Communist Party, and Xi made a further speech at the CCP United Front Work 
Conference in May 2015, emphasising that 
We have to increase online interaction and offline communication with 
representative members from the new media, and persuade them to use positive 
energy to clean the cyberspace and sing the main melody. 
The social responsibility of the Internet platforms and the destabilising potential of the 
Internet were further stressed by the People’s Daily Public Monitor Office: 
“Some might think that Internet platforms are neutral content deliveries, and we 
should not ask too much social responsibility of them. However, as a social 
product, with such a large user base, Internet platforms must have higher social 
responsibility than other Internet companies… the Internet is the biggest variable 
during social transitions, as it can challenge the market and social order, and 
create anxieties in the social mood. How to control this variable needs the 
collective effort of the platform provider, beneficiaries, and the government.” 
(Hua, Canliang, and Pan 2018) 
In another editorial, People’s Daily noted that online propaganda work should be directed at 
two types of people: the opinion leaders, as they are key ‘social influencers’ hence can play 
an instrumental role in disseminating the propaganda work; and the youth, who are easily 
influenced by ‘outside forces’ and must be ‘guided properly’ (People's Daily Editorial 2018). 
Thus, social influencers, such as the CEO of Zhihu, popular Weibo and Wechat bloggers and 
Internet writers were invited to attend study meetings organised by the UFWD (Pengpai 
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2018). Attendees were taken to patriotic education bases and asked to study Xi Jinping 
Thought and take seminars on CCP theory. At the end of the three day study meeting, 
attendees were asked to leave reflections on how they found the experience. The conforming 
comments echoing Party lines subsequently published are particularly illuminating: 
Internet writers of the new era has been given the task of ideological 
dissemination and we must be aware of different ideological camps. We have to 
create protagonists with the right kind of patriotic values so we can guide our 
readers, and minimise negative voices. — Cyber-fiction writer He Changzai, 
member of the CPPCC 
We must take up more social responsibility and contribute more towards the 
building of a clean and purified cyberspace. — Zhou Yuan, CEO of Zhihu, 
member of the CPPCC 
Many of these social influencers, such as the CEO of Zhihu, are also members of the 
National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), 
which is a political advisory body mainly containing non-CCP delegates from various social, 
political, commercial and religious organisations. This echoes the attempt made by the CCP 
to incorporate economic elites into the Party apparatus through organisations such as CPPCC, 
so that they would have vested interests in the Chinese state just like political elites (M. Chen 
2015; J. Chen and Dickson 2010). Thus, the CCP has ensured that cyber opinion leaders have 
been incorporated into the wider propaganda and narrative-building network, to make sure 
that public opinion can indeed be wielded as ‘a tool for mainstream political institutions 
rather than individual opinion leaders online’ (Hua, Canliang, and Pan 2018).  
Conclusion 
Just like any feature of the Chinese political system, Internet governance in China is flexible 
and adaptive (Heilmann and Perry 2011). Indiscriminate and stringent negative censorship 
risks serious backlash among the netizens and traditional forms of preaching propaganda has 
been shown to be ineffective in the cyberspace. In a repressive political environment such as 
China, minor incidents have the potential to catch the public’s attention and spread like 
wildfire online, due to ‘generalised anger that has built up over time’ (Fewsmith 2008). In 
order to maintain a ‘legible and predictable society’ (Creemers 2017), participatory 
censorship and narrative shaping have become crucial content control strategies, along with 
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the incorporation of digital elites into political elites. The space for contention and dissent 
online has not only narrowed but also transformed, as the Party-state allows and even 
encourages certain types of socio-moral contention in line with its ideological goals. Any 
other types of contention, apolitical or otherwise, are delegitimised. Grassroot contentious 
narratives, therefore, must fit within the grander official narrative in order to survive and be 
heard, and often have to appeal to the central-level institutions and agencies to act as the 
ultimate arbiter when they come into conflict with local censors, effectively calling upon a 
kind of paternalistic protection from the Party-state. On the one hand, this strengthens the 
Party-state’s claim to legitimacy as the ultimate moral authority in Chinese society, on the 
other hand, this weakens the legitimacy and power of the intermediary institutions such as 
local agencies and authorities who have been tasked with the day-to-day decisions of cyber 
governance. This has laid the foundation for the simplification of politics which in turn could 
lead to a rise in populist sentiments in the cyberspace that could be potentially explosive 
when interacted with its foreign counterparts in the current global political climate. 
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